What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?

The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. I go on to articulate a theory of what I call existential grounding, a notion which explains the role that prospective children play in the lives of many would-be parents. Procreative ethicists who want their work to have real practical relevance must, I claim, start to engage with this markedly first-personal kind of practical consideration

The function of morality

What is the function of morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus has recently emerged. Impressed by developments in evolutionary theory, many philosophers now tell us that the function of morality is to reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to efficiently promote the well-being of its members. In this paper, I subject this consensus to rigorous scrutiny, arguing that the functional hypothesis in question is not well supported. In particular, I attack the supposed evidential relation between an evolutionary genealogy of morals and the functional hypothesis itself. I show that there are a great many functionally relevant discontinuities between our own culture and the culture within which morality allegedly emerged, and I argue that this seriously weakens the inference from morality’s evolutionary history to its present-day function

Nothing Personal: On the Limits of the Impersonal Temperament in Ethics

David Benatar has argued both for anti-natalism and for a certain pessimism about life's meaning. In this paper, I propose that these positions are expressions of a deeply impersonal philosophical temperament. This is not a problem on its own; we all have our philosophical instincts. The problem is that this particular temperament, I argue, leads Benatar astray, since it prevents him from answering a question that any moral philosopher must answer. This is the question of rational authority, which requires the moral philosopher to say why existing human agents have strong practical reasons to comply with the philosopher's dictates. A purely impersonal ethical system can never do this, and this is why Benatar has no answer to this question

Self-Reactivity and the Expression of Memory Markers Vary Independently in MRL-Mp+/+ and MRL-Mp-lpr/lpr Mice

MRL-Mp-lpr/lpr mice contain phenotypically abnormal populations of T cells, and exhibit an SLE-like autoimmune disease in which autoantibodies are a prominent feature. We analyzed the phenotype and T-cell receptor Vß expression pattern in CD4+ T cells of this mutant mouse strain to detect abnormalities that could explain the autoimmunity. The CD4+ T cells contain two distinct abnormal populations. One of these expresses B220 and HSA, and in these and other respects closely resembles the accumulating CD4–CD8– population. The other expresses a high level of CD44 (Pgp-1), and a high level of the 16A epitope of CD45, and so resembles post-activation T cells. Both of these cell types are exclusive to MRL-Mp-lpr/lpr. We also identified V ß5- and V ß11-positive CD4+ T cells, in both MRL-Mp-lpr/lpr and MRL-Mp-+/+ mice. We conclude that autoimmune T cells can be detected in these mice, but that they are not the cause of the accumulation of abnormal CD4+ and CD4–CD8–cells